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What “Being a Watchdog” Really Means: 
Removing the Attorney General from the 
Supervision of Charitable Trusts 
Kelly McNabb* 
The Great Recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis 
has caused significant hardships to many realms of American 
society, not only economically, but also politically, psychologi-
cally, and socially.1 The charitable sector is no exception.2 For 
example, universities grappling with depleted endowments 
have sold assets, including charitable trusts, which once 
seemed off-limits or untouchable.3 Perhaps not surprisingly, 
these sales have generated litigation brought by protesters 
questioning their legality.4 These cases highlight the inconsist-
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 1. Robert J. Samuelson, The Great Stranglehold, WASH. POST, July 12, 
2010, at 15, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/07/11/AR2010071103038.html.  
 2. See Megan Loving, Comment, An Arm and a Van Gogh: Selling Art 
Collections from Charitable Contributions for Capital Gain is a High Price to 
Pay, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 455, 455 (2009) (mentioning the 
financial struggle of institutions and universities in the recent recession). 
 3. See, e.g., Jennifer Brooks, Fisk Says Its Survival Depends on Art Sale, 
TENNESSEAN, Aug. 12, 2010, at Main News, available at 2010 WLNR 
16052059 (reporting Fisk University’s attempt to sell the “renowned modern 
art collection donated to Fisk half a century ago by artist Georgia O’Keeffe”); 
Richard Lacayo, Brandeis’ Attempt to Turn Art into Assets, TIME (Feb. 5, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1877265,00.html (“Brandeis 
University . . . stunned both the academic and art worlds when it announced 
that it would shut down its Rose Art Museum and sell the collection.”).  
 4. See, e.g., In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, at 1 (Ch. Tenn., Sept. 14, 
2010), available at http://www.tennessean.com/assets/pdf/DN164021914.pdf 
(discussing the attempt to keep the Stieglitz Art Collection at Fisk Universi-
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encies among regulatory approaches taken by attorneys gen-
eral, who traditionally monitor the governance of charitable 
trusts to ensure compliance with the donors’ intents. For in-
stance, the Minnesota Attorney General did not intervene when 
St. Olaf College sold WCAL, a radio station created by donors, 
to Minnesota Public Radio.5 On the other hand, the Tennessee 
Attorney General attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to take con-
trol of the Stieglitz Art Collection from Fisk University.6 The 
Attorney General continues to seek prevention of the Universi-
ty’s sale of the collection—a gift from Georgia O’Keeffe that 
created a charitable trust—as the school hunts for a means of 
“digging out of its financial hole.”7  
Theoretically, when overseeing charitable trusts attorneys 
general are restricted to considering the donors’ intent or the 
public interest.8 But other forces are likely at work. For one, at-
torneys general are influenced by politics.9 Second, monitoring 
the administration of charitable trusts may not always be the 
top priority of attorneys general among the numerous other du-
ties entrusted to their offices.10 Indeed, given the scope of du-
ties vested to attorneys general, it is easy to see how charitable 
trusts would not be a primary concern.  
 
ty); In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. A09-703, 2009 WL 5092650, at *4 
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (discussing SaveWCAL’s challenge of the sale of 
WCAL Radio). 
 5. Order at 5, In re Certain Gifts to St. Olaf Coll., No. CV-06-2518 (Minn. 
Dist. Ct. June 10, 2008) (noting the lack of action by the attorney general and 
the district court judge’s declaration that he was “absolutely mystified as to why 
the State Attorney General did not become involved in a sale of trust assets”).  
 6. Brooks, supra note 3, passim. 
 7. Jennifer Brooks, Judge Rejects State’s Plan to Move Fisk Art, 
TENNESSEAN (Sept. 15, 2010, 2:34 AM), http://www.tennessean.com/article/ 
20100915/NEWS01/9150359/judge-rejects-state-s-plan-to-move-Fisk-art; see 
also Duane Marsteller, Art Deal in Jeopardy, TENNESSEAN, Jan. 7, 2012, at 
News, available at 2012 WLNR 447365 (explaining the continued efforts of the 
Tennessee Attorney General to prevent the sale).  
 8. See Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism & Paternalism in State 
Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946–48 (2004) (discussing the 
challenges of monitoring fiduciaries and ensuring that charitable donations 
are spent “as represented to donors”). 
 9. Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State At-
torneys General as National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525, 537–38 (1994) 
(noting that with the expansion of the “size and responsibilities of state attor-
neys general’s offices” came a breed of attorneys general that were more inter-
ested “in getting votes and enhancing their own political careers” than in “pro-
tecting the citizens of their states” (citation omitted)). 
 10. See Brody, supra note 8 (pointing out the wide range of areas moni-
tored by attorneys general). 
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Therefore, although the “responsibility for public supervi-
sion of charitable trusts traditionally has been delegated to the 
Attorney General,”11 this Note argues that state attorneys gen-
eral are not the most effective parties to govern charitable 
trusts. Part I explains the background and current structure of 
charitable trust law, and the role that attorneys general have 
traditionally played in the administration and disposition of 
charitable trusts. Part II addresses why this current structure 
has proved unworkable, as evidenced by the recent tumultuous 
sales of charitable trusts, the inconsistencies among attorneys 
general, and why attorneys general cannot always be effective 
watchdogs. This Part also addresses the shortcomings of pro-
posed solutions to the supervision of charitable trusts. And fi-
nally, Part III proposes that an independent, self-funded, qua-
si-state agency should be vested with the authority to monitor 
charitable trusts. This Note concludes that oversight by an in-
dependent quasi-state agency reduces political influence on su-
pervision and ensures that oversight of charitable trusts will 
remain a priority in order to protect the public interest each 
charitable trust serves.  
I.  CHARITABLE TRUSTS AND THE ROLE OF STATE 
ATTORNEYS GENERAL   
This Part introduces the general law and development of 
charitable trusts, including the role of attorneys general in 
monitoring trusts created to promote the public interest.12 It 
continues by setting the foundation for the argument that is 
developed in Part II of this Note—namely, that attorneys gen-
eral have failed to supervise charitable trusts effectively. This 
Part concludes by explaining the effect of the current financial 
crisis on the charitable sector, noting it has only exacerbated 
the unresolved problems in charitable trust law.  
 
 11. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2002). 
 12. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 
5, 2009) (noting that there may be a need for special interest standing because 
attorneys general lack sufficient means of enforcement); James J. Fishman, 
Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 224 (2003) (“The ob-
ject of charitable trusts is to benefit the community rather than private indi-
viduals.”); About NAAG, NAT’L ASS’N ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/ 
about_naag.php ( last visited June 4, 2012) (“As chief legal officers of the 
states, commonwealths, and territories of the United States, the Attorneys 
General serve as counselors to state government agencies and legislatures, 
and as representatives of the public interest.”). 
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A. THE LAW OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
Charitable trusts are created for a variety of reasons, 
which include: “(a) the relief of poverty; (b) the advancement of 
knowledge or education; (c) the advancement of religion; (d) the 
promotion of health; (e) governmental or municipal purposes; 
and (f) other purposes that are beneficial to the community.”13 
The trustee of a charitable trust, such as a university or a hos-
pital, manages the trust in accordance with the trust’s public-
interest purpose(s).14 The charitable trust document defines the 
purposes and objectives, as well as administrative procedures 
for managing the trust.15 The trustee is bound by the wishes of 
the donor and is barred from deviating from those specific pur-
poses.16 Therefore, the trustee has fiduciary duties to honor the 
intent of the donor.17 
Additionally, because charitable trusts benefit the commu-
nity and do not have ascertainable beneficiaries, the trusts are 
 
 13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003); see Terri Lynn Helge, 
Policing the Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal 
Charity Oversight Board, 19 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 n.77 (2009) 
(“[E]ducational institutions and hospitals represented approximately 70% of 
registered public charity resources.”). 
 14. See MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZA-
TIONS: FEDERAL AND STATE LAW AND REGULATION 133 (2004) (“A charitable 
trust is similar to a private trust in that a trustee holds and manages the 
property not for the benefit of specified individuals but for certain defined 
purposes that are considered to be of benefit to the public at large.”). 
 15. Fishman, supra note 12, at 225. 
 16. 15 AM. JUR. 2D Charities § 75 (2011) (“If a charitable organization ac-
cepts a bequest for a specific purpose, it is bound to use the bequest for the 
purpose specified and the trustees of the organization will be barred from us-
ing it for any other purpose.”); Ilana H. Eisenstein, Comment, Keeping Charity 
in Charitable Trust Law: The Barnes Foundation and the Case for Considera-
tion of Public Interest in Administration of Charitable Trusts, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1747, 1756–57 (2003); see also John K. Eason, Motive, Duty, and the 
Management of Restricted Charitable Gifts, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 128 
(2010) (“[D]onors impose restrictions in order (1) to support the donor’s belief 
in worthy charitable objectives and the causes best suited to accomplishing 
those objectives; (2) to constrain charitable management from straying from 
the donor’s own view of what are, or how to accomplish those charitable objec-
tives; (3) to freeze in place the donor’s individual notions of appropriate but 
evolving public policy; and (4) quite simply, to exercise and enjoy a significant 
power that society has chosen to bestow on donors through the law of charita-
ble gifts.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Helge, supra note 13, at 9 (“These fiduciary standards are the 
duty of care, the duty of loyalty, and the duty of obedience.”); Robert A. Katz, 
Let Charitable Directors Direct: Why Trust Law Should Not Curb Board Dis-
cretion Over a Charitable Corporation’s Mission and Unrestricted Assets, 80 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 694 (2005) (“The trustee is subject to the fiduciary du-
ties of loyalty . . . and care.”).  
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“not subject to the rule against perpetuities, and are therefore 
of unlimited duration.”18 Consequentially, it is only natural 
that at some point the donor’s restrictions on the charitable 
trust may become problematic or unworkable.19 In the event 
that this happens, the trustee can seek judicial approval 
through the cy près doctrine, which allows the courts to over-
ride “unlawful, impossible, or impracticable” restrictions.20 It is 
presumed that by modifying or releasing donor restrictions the 
charitable trust will be “saved,” yet still follow the donor’s over-
all wishes.21 Although at first glance the cy près doctrine seems 
unobjectionable, problems may arise in deciphering donors’  
intent.22  
Moreover, the longevity of charitable trusts does not only 
create problems when determining donor intent when the trust 
becomes unfeasible. Honoring donor intent—a strict standard 
of charitable trust law—in the face of economic and social 
changes also creates complexities in monitoring and preventing 
the misuse of charitable trusts. As explained in more detail be-
 
 18. Fishman, supra note 12. Because charitable trusts are created to ben-
efit the public interest, the justification for allowing the gift in spite of the rule 
against perpetuities is that the “funds are being devoted, or ultimately will be 
devoted, to a public purpose, and therefore the indefinite life of the charitable 
gift is an irrelevant consideration.” Robert J. Lynn, Perpetuities: The Duration 
of Charitable Trusts and Foundations, 13 UCLA L. REV. 1074, 1083 (1966). 
However, it has been proved that these charitable gifts can be mismanaged 
and wasted, and because the trust has a “life of its own” the mismanagement 
often goes “unnoticed and therefore unchecked.” Id. Although it is an interest-
ing argument to apply the rule against perpetuities, or some version of the 
rule, to charitable trusts to avoid the litigation battles that have been experi-
enced across the nation recently, see Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the 
Living Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 
1183, 1186–87 (2007), this Note will argue that an effective watchdog will cure 
these issues, while still allowing donor’s wishes to be carried out well into the 
future. Restructuring trust law is unnecessary.  
 19. Eason, supra note 16, at 124–25 (stating that cy près is a mechanism 
to address these changing circumstances and objectives).  
 20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 (2003); see also Eason, supra 
note 16, at 141–44 (elaborating on a trustee’s fiduciary duties and the use of 
the cy près doctrine). 
 21. See Brody, supra note 18, at 1236–39 (outlining the cy près doctrine); 
Eason, supra note 16, at 125 (noting that the cy près doctrine authorizes “mod-
ification of the donor’s restrictive mandates”).  
 22. Eason, supra note 16, at 125, 126 (describing the fact-specific inquiry 
involved in deciphering donor intent and the chilling effect the cy près doctrine 
can have on charitable giving).  
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low, the law of charitable trusts has struggled to find an ade-
quate solution to the regulation of charitable trusts.23 
B. THE ROLE OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN SUPERVISING 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
Attorneys general have a significant role in the supervision 
of charitable trusts. If the trustee of a charitable trust breaches 
his fiduciary duty,24 state attorneys general have traditionally 
held the power to enforce the trusts, drawing on charitable 
trusts’ purpose to benefit the public at large.25 This role was 
inherited from English law and is “known as parens patriae.”26 
The power allows the attorney general to bring suit to correct 
any abuses of the charitable trust, but it does not allow the at-
torney general to act as a “co-trustee of a charitable trust.”27 In 
some states this authority to enforce charitable trusts is statu-
 
 23. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS pt. II, ch. 
3, at 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (claiming that the law of charitable trusts 
contains only broad boundaries rather than specific guidance). 
 24. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 229–30 (“There are generally three 
main types of fiduciary breach: (1) of the duty of loyalty involving a misappro-
priation of an asset or something of value, (2) of the duty of care consisting of 
the negligent attention to the beneficiaries’ needs or estate, [or, with charita-
ble trusts, neglecting the public interest defined in the charitable trust in-
strument], and (3) of the duty of obedience, requiring compliance with the ex-
pressed purposes of the organization.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 25. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d 324, 330 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2002) (“[ I ]n every proceeding which affects a charitable trust, whether the ac-
tion concerns invalidation, administration, termination or enforcement, the 
attorney general must be made a party of record because the public as the real 
party in interest in the trust is otherwise not properly represented.” (quoting 
In re Pruner’s Estate, 136 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa. 1957))); MODEL PROT. OF CHARI-
TABLE ASSETS ACT § 3 (2011), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf; 
Helge, supra note 13, at 11–13, 12 n.56 (“The state attorney general has the 
power to redress breaches of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of charitable 
funds, mismanagement of the charitable organization, and fraud in the solici-
tation of charitable funds.”); Loving, supra note 2, at 460. 
 26. Brody, supra note 8, at 938; see also FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, 
at 32 (“With the decline of the use of commissions provided for in the Statute 
of Charitable Uses, it fell to the Attorney General, representing the Crown as 
parens patriae with a prerogative right, to protect all charitable trusts.”). For a 
discussion on the development of the Attorney General’s role in England and 
the incorporation of that role into the American legal system, see David Villar 
Patton, The Queen, the Attorney General, and the Modern Charitable Fiduci-
ary: A Historical Perspective on Charitable Enforcement Reform, 11 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134–45 (2000).  
 27. Jennifer L. Komoroski, The Hershey Trust’s Quest to Diversify: Rede-
fining the State Attorney General’s Role When Charitable Trusts Wish to Diver-
sify, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1769, 1784 (2004).  
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tory, and in the absence of statutory authority, attorneys gen-
eral have enforcement power under common law.28  
Not every state gives exclusive authority to monitor chari-
ties to the attorney general. Some states have divided that reg-
ulatory authority among “the secretary of state, the insurance 
commissioner or another state agency” and the attorney gen-
eral.29 Some courts have also granted standing to private indi-
viduals to enforce the charitable trust if the individual can 
demonstrate a sufficient interest in the operation of the trust.30 
At the federal level, the Internal Revenue Service indirectly 
regulates the charitable sector through the federal income tax 
exemption for charitable organizations.31 Although other par-
ties may play a role in trust enforcement, attorneys general 
remain “the most important state player[s].”32 
For centuries attorneys general have participated in the 
regulation of charitable trusts and partaken in cy près proceed-
 
 28. Helge, supra note 13, at 12 n.58; William P. Marshall, Break Up the 
Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided 
Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2452–53 (2006).  
 29. DAVID BIEMESDERFER & ANDRAS KOSARAS, COUNCIL ON FOUNDS., 
THE VALUE OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN STATE CHARITY REGULATORS & PHI-
LANTHROPY 14 (2006), available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/ 
Building%20Strong%20Ethical%20Foundations/06AGreportfull.pdf; see also 
FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 364–70 (explaining that other agencies 
“are empowered to supervise at least some aspects of the administration of 
charities”); Brody, supra note 8, at 949 (“[D]epending on the industry in which 
it operates, a given nonprofit organization might also be regulated by such 
other agencies as the insurance commissioner, the department of health, edu-
cation, or commerce, or the corporations commission.”).  
 30. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 
5, 2009) (summarizing cases that recognize standing of private individuals due 
to their special interest in a particular charitable trust); Helge, supra note 13, 
at 35–36 (observing that courts are allowing private parties to bring suits on 
behalf of charitable trusts on a more frequent basis); see also infra notes 67–71 
and accompanying text. But see Brody, supra note 18, at 1187 (“Traditionally, 
private parties—including donors—have no legal authority to sue to enforce 
charitable duties.”).  
 31. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 56–62 (outlining the historical 
development of federal tax exemptions for charitable organizations); Kenneth 
L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Respon-
sibility, 73 HARV. L. REV. 433, 437–39 (1960) (discussing the general effect of 
federal tax law on charitable organizations). This Note will not focus on the 
regulatory role of the IRS in charitable trust governance because regulation at 
the state level is preferred. 
 32. Brody, supra note 8, at 943; see also Helge, supra note 13, at 13 
(“[T]he effectiveness of state regulation of the charitable sector depends almost 
entirely on the manner in which the attorney general performs his enforce-
ment function.”).  
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ings.33 But it was not until the end of World War II that attor-
neys general prominently took action to enforce charitable trust 
law.34 By the early 1950s, several states adopted laws requiring 
charitable trusts to register and report to the attorney gen-
eral,35 and in 1954 the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws adopted a model act.36 A number of 
states have adopted this Uniform Act or similar legislation37 in 
order to improve the supervision of the charitable sector by the 
attorney general.38 For those organizations required to act in 
accordance with this legislation,39 the most significant provi-
sion in the Uniform Act requires charities to register with the 
 
 33. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54; Fishman, supra note 12, at 259 
(analogizing to English law, from which the attorney general’s power was 
adopted, and noting that “[e]ven before the enactment of the Statute of Chari-
table Uses in 1601, suits were brought by the attorney general to enforce char-
itable trusts.”).  
 34. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54, 311. 
 35. Id. at 312 (noting that following the New Hampshire Charitable Trus-
tees Act, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ohio, and Massachusetts legislatures 
passed similar bills between 1950 and 1954); Karst, supra note 31, at 479 
(stating that New Hampshire was the first state to require registration and 
reporting); see, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7:28 (LexisNexis 1955) (requiring 
registration and reporting for New Hampshire charitable trusts). 
 36. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 54, 311–12 (explaining the adop-
tion and approval by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, 
of the National Association of Attorneys General, and the Commissioners’ 
draft of a Uniform Act for Supervision of Trustees for Charitable Purposes). 
 37. Id. at 312–13; Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52 & n.53 (“[T]welve states 
have some form of charity registration.”).  
 38. BIEMESDERFER, supra note 29, at 4 (noting that the Uniform Act has 
“several provisions intended to enhance the attorney general’s knowledge of 
the existence and administration of charities”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 
14, at 54. “New York State has one of the most comprehensive notice and over-
sight schemes.” Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52. The Attorney General’s Chari-
ties Bureau manages all registration and annual reports, as well as respond-
ing to and investigating complaints about improper actions by charities. See 
N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., About the Charities Bureau, CHARITIES 
NYS.COM, http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp ( last visited June 4, 
2012). For the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’ 
recently developed model act on attorney general protection of charitable as-
sets, see MODEL PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_ 
PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf. 
 39. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 315 (“[C]ertain charities are 
exempted from the filing requirements, most commonly religious organiza-
tions and governmental entities.”); Helge, supra note 13, at 14–15 (“Of these 
eleven jurisdictions, most exempt schools and hospitals . . . from the filing  
requirement.”).  
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attorney general upon creation or shortly thereafter and period-
ically report financial information.40 
To date only twelve states have adopted the Uniform Act or 
similar legislation to protect charitable trusts from breaches of 
the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.41 But many more states 
have endowed their attorneys general with power to police 
charitable trusts that seek contributions through laws regulat-
ing charitable solicitation.42 In the 1940s, the increase of funds 
from the public to charitable organizations, coupled with “pub-
licized scandals,” led to state legislation regulating the solicita-
tion of charitable funds.43 This regulatory power is often incor-
porated into the consumer protection duties of attorneys 
general, and is therefore generally better staffed and managed 
than the supervision by attorneys general over the fiduciary 
duties of trustees to the charitable trusts in honoring the intent 
of donors.44  
C. CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS  
Even with these increased investigative powers, attorneys 
general have not curbed all instances of abuse and misuse of 
charitable trusts.45 As mentioned above, recent litigation in-
volving sales of charitable trusts demonstrates the unresolved 
issues within charitable trust law and the uncertainty involved 
in enforcing a trust in accordance with donors’ intent.46 Schol-
 
 40. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 315.  
 41. Id. at 443.  
 42. Id. (explaining that “thirty-nine of the fifty states and the District of 
Columbia” have laws regulating “solicitations of funds for charitable purpos-
es”); see STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 186 
(Lynne M. Ross ed., 1990) [hereinafter STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL] (explain-
ing that the solicitation filing requirements stem from the fact that in the 
1940s the number of charities increased, and as a result “fund raising became 
more sophisticated”). However, “[i]t should be emphasized that the regulation 
of charitable trusts and the regulation of charitable solicitations need not be 
mutually exclusive functions, even though in practice they are often treated 
that way.” Id.  
 43. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42. 
 44. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443. 
 45. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 263–64 (explaining that registration 
and reporting does not make the “attorney general an active or efficient moni-
tor of nonprofit organization or improve charitable accountability” and most of 
this information is disregarded anyways). 
 46. See supra notes 4–7 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., THE ART OF 
THE STEAL (IFC Films 2010) (calling the “takeover” of the Barnes Foundation 
a “vast conspiracy” in which the attorney general was aware and even a party 
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ars have argued that changes in the regulatory authority must 
be made to improve accountability of the trustees.47 Commen-
tators have proposed supervisory organizations at the state and 
federal level, including committees that report to the attorney 
general or wholly separate entities.48 The American Law Insti-
tute is currently working on a project on the governance of 
nonprofit organizations.49 Chapter Six of the Principles of the 
Law of Nonprofit Organization will deal with supervision and 
enforcement, but the full scope of the project is expected to take 
several more years.50 Similarly, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Law recently drafted a model 
act that states can adopt regarding attorneys general protec-
tion of charitable assets.51 The committee focused “on state at-
torneys general authority with regard to the protection of char-
itable assets, notice requirements, remedies, and principles to 
guide attorneys general in interstate and multi-state cases.”52 
Although many scholars have addressed the problems that are 
embedded in charitable trust law, as explained in detail in Part 
II, a workable solution has yet to be found.  
D. CHARITABLE TRUSTS IN UNCERTAIN TIMES 
The unresolved issues in charitable trust law were exacer-
bated when the Great Recession hit. The charitable sector has 
 
of the moving of the Barnes art collection to downtown Philadelphia, which 
was contrary to an explicit restriction by Barnes himself).  
 47. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 8, at 1035 (mentioning proposals for chari-
ties boards or supervisory commissions); Helge, supra note 13, at 1 (arguing in 
favor of a federal quasi-public agency to regulate charitable organizations). 
 48. Fishman, supra note 12, at 272, 287 (proposing a state advisory com-
mittee, which would operate under the attorney general to improve the inves-
tigation of wrongdoings and to develop the accountability of the charitable sec-
tor); Helge, supra note 13, at 1 (suggesting a “new, federal, quasi-public 
agency that would be the principal regulator of the charitable sector”); Karst, 
supra note 31, at 476–77 (proposing that a separate state-funded administra-
tive agency hold the responsibility to regulate charities).  
 49. Current Projects: Principles of the Law of Nonprofit Organizations, 
A.L.I., http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=3 
( last visited June 4, 2012).  
 50. Id.  
 51. MODEL PROT. OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT (2011), available at http:// 
www.uniformlaws.org/Shared/Docs/AM2011_Prestyle%20Finals/MPOCAA_ 
PreStyleFinal_Jul11.pdf. 
 52. Memorandum from Stanley C. Kent to Connie T. Eyster, Statutory 
Revision Comm. Chair (Mar. 4, 2010), available at http://www.cobar 
.org/repository/Inside_Bar/TrustEstate/SRC/SRC%20UNIFORM%20ACTS%20
REPORT-03-04-2010.pdf. 
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not been shielded from the economic downturn.53 Although 
strict adherence to the donors’ wishes is fundamental to chari-
table trust law and is supported by social and moral perspec-
tives,54 an economy in turmoil may provide a financial incentive 
to avoid this stringent requirement.55 Yet without demonstrat-
ed compliance to the intent of donors, charitable giving, and 
creation of charitable trusts will be discouraged if donors’ fear 
their wishes will not be honored.56 Therefore, in situations 
where the conditions of a charitable trust become problematic, 
the intent of donors must be balanced against the public bene-
fit, which is, after all, the overarching goal of charitable 
trusts.57  
II.  THE DOWNFALLS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL AS THE 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS’ WATCHDOGS   
This Part of the Note addresses the shortcoming of attor-
neys general as the overseers of charitable trusts and explores 
alternatives that could better balance donors’ intent with the 
public benefit. Several elements contribute to the ineffective-
ness of attorneys general, including: the variety of duties im-
posed on attorneys general that make charitable trusts a sec-
ondary concern; the practical concern of lacking funding in the 
 
 53. See GUIDESTAR, THE EFFECT OF THE ECONOMY ON THE NONPROFIT 
SECTOR 3 (2010) (showing a total decrease in contributions to nonprofit organ-
izations in the first half of 2010 compared to the previous year); Noelle Barton 
& Holly Hall, Donations Dropped 11% at Nation’s Biggest Charities Last Year, 
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY (Oct. 17, 2010), available at http://philanthropy.com/ 
article/A-Sharp-Donation-Drop-at-Big/125004/ (observing charitable giving 
has dropped significantly, and there are no signs that point to a recovery).  
 54. See Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1757 (“Steadfast respect for donor 
intent has been justified by theories of private property, freedom of testation, 
and society’s moral and legal obligation to the donor’s largess.”). 
 55. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 3 (reporting that Fisk University chose to 
sell its donated collection of art out of financial necessity); Scott Jaschik, 
Brandeis Will Keep Its Art, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 1, 2011, 3:00 AM), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2011/07/01/brandeis_settles_suits_by_ 
agreeing_to_keep_its_art_collection (same at Brandeis University); see also Eve-
lyn Brody, The Charity in Bankruptcy and Ghosts of Donors Past, Present, and 
Future, 29 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 471, 528 (2005) (“[ I ]f assets are held for nar-
row charitable purposes, redeployment within the charity can be impeded, 
perhaps even precipitating financial collapse.”). 
 56. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1758. 
 57. Fishman, supra note 12; see also Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing 
to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 39 (1993) (“[State gov-
ernments] would have to balance the vital societal interest in promoting chari-
table work, with the intertwined need to maintain public confidence in, and fi-
nancial support of, that work by ensuring honest and competent management.”). 
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offices of attorneys general; and the innate political nature of 
being an elected official, which subjects attorneys general to 
improper political pressures. Specific examples from the Barnes 
Foundation and WCAL transactions illustrate the type of pow-
erful political actors involved in these dealings, leading to the 
susceptibility of attorneys general failing to enforce charitable 
trusts. Additionally, this Part criticizes proposals, as briefly 
mentioned above, that would create an organization that re-
ports to the state attorney general because such an organiza-
tion would not remove political influences. Shortcomings of 
proposals that would create a separate, yet state-funded agency 
are also examined in this Part. As a final point, this Part will 
argue a federal agency would not adequately respond to the 
public interests at a state level. 
A. LACK OF MOTIVATION, TIME, RESOURCES, AND POLITICAL 
INFLUENCE DIMINISH THE ABILITY OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL TO 
ENFORCE CHARITABLE TRUSTS  
Attorneys general have shown to be ineffective watchdogs 
to curb exploitation of charitable trusts.58 One reason for this 
ineffectiveness is a lack of motivation and time, which can be 
attributed to the numerous duties that are imposed on attor-
neys general.59 Secondly, offices of the attorneys general gener-
ally lack adequate resources, such as funding and staff, needed 
to successfully oversee charitable trusts.60 A third reason is 
that since the state attorney general is an “inherently political 
creature” the “incentives of this nearly universally elective of-
fice impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically 
dangerous and to jump into matters that are politically irresist-
ible but implicate only ‘business’ decisions of charity manag-
ers.”61 As explained below, these foundational issues seem to be 
embedded in the offices of the attorneys general, and in order to 
 
 58. See Brody, supra note 8, at 947 (explaining that “only a few state at-
torneys general have been active in a realm firmly committed to state regula-
tion and enforcement” of the “monitoring and oversight of charities”); Fish-
man, supra note 12, at 268 (“It has long been demonstrated that the state 
attorney general offices have neither the person-power, nor sometimes the 
will, to monitor nonprofits effectively.”); see also PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
NONPROFIT ORGS. pt. II, ch. 3, at 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (“It has 
seemed acceptable for charities to be governed casually, if not ceremonially, by 
their boards, allowing too much reign to management . . . .”). 
 59. See Patton, supra note 26, at 165 (noting the “impossibly overwhelm-
ing case load” for which attorneys general are responsible).  
 60. Brody, supra note 8, at 939; Patton, supra note 26, at 166. 
 61. Brody, supra note 8, at 947–48. 
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avoid these problems the charitable-trust-supervisory role 
should be removed from attorneys general.  
1. Attorneys General Lack the Interest, Motivation, and Time 
to Supervise Charitable Trusts 
The offices of attorneys general lack the incentive neces-
sary to effectively supervise charitable trusts. The habitual 
long list of duties of attorneys general—ranging from antitrust 
enforcement to the supervision of charitable trusts (at the bot-
tom of the list)—stem from their role as the “chief legal officers 
of the states, commonwealths, and territories of the United 
States . . . .”62 Among all these obligations, regulation of the 
charitable sector comprises only a “small subset of the state at-
torney general’s larger role as a consumer protector.”63 And the 
primary focus within that subset is the even smaller subset of 
charitable solicitations.64 The degree of focus on the solicitation 
of charitable funds does not enable attorneys general to “detect 
breaches of fiduciary duties by charity managers,” and because 
charitable trusts generally do not “solicit funds from the public, 
their operations go virtually unchecked.”65 Therefore, with re-
spect to trustees’ violations of charitable trusts—fiduciary 
breaches—attorneys general are, as one scholar put it, “‘inac-
tive, ineffective, understaffed, overwhelmed, or some combina-
tion of these.’”66 
 
 62. About NAAG, supra note 12 (“Typical powers of the Attorneys Gen-
eral, while varying from one jurisdiction to the next due to statutory and con-
stitutional mandates, now include the authority to: institute civil suits; repre-
sent state agencies; defend and/or challenge the constitutionality of legislative 
or administrative actions; enforce open meetings and records laws; revoke cor-
porate charters; enforce antitrust prohibitions against monopolistic enterpris-
es; and enforce air, water pollution, and hazardous waste laws. In a majority 
of states, handle criminal appeals and serious state-wide criminal prosecu-
tions; intervene in public utility rate cases; and enforce the provisions of chari-
table trusts.”); see also Brody, supra note 8, at 946 & nn.33–36 (“In recent 
years, state attorneys general have dramatically expanded their role in areas 
ranging from public health to antitrust to Wall Street.”). 
 63. Helge, supra note 13, at 24. 
 64. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (observing that oversight 
of the solicitation of charitable funds “is far better staffed and managed in 
most states than the efforts to police fiduciary duties”); Helge, supra note 13, 
at 24 (“[S]tate attorneys general view their ‘biggest problem’ in the charitable 
sector as deceptive charitable solicitations.”).  
 65. Helge, supra note 13, at 24–25.  
 66. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (quoting Harvey P. Dale, 
Norman A. Sugarman Memorial Lecture: Diversity, Accountability, and Com-
pliance in the Nonprofit Sector (Mar. 20, 1991)); see also Fishman, supra note 
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The judiciary has noticed this lack of enthusiasm to enforce 
charitable trusts. Courts have allowed private parties to bring 
suit to enforce the trust.67 Courts have not usually granted 
standing to the general public because of the fear that fiduciar-
ies, faced with constant harassment from litigation, would find 
it impossible and impractical to manage charitable funds.68 In-
stead the interested private party would have to try to per-
suade the attorney general into filing suit.69 However, attor-
neys general have reasons not to enforce the trust, such as lack 
of resources and political incentives. Additionally, private par-
ties who are interested in the charitable trust are more likely to 
avidly pursue enforcement of the donors’ wishes as compared to 
attorneys general.70 Therefore, the courts developed the rule 
that an individual could bring a lawsuit when the attorney 
general failed to do so if the private party could demonstrate a 
special benefit or interest in the trust.71 
As an example of private-party action, a group called 
“SaveWCAL” sued to intervene in the controversial sale of St. 
Olaf College’s radio station WCAL.72 Interestingly, the Minne-
sota Attorney General failed to act even after determining that 
WCAL was in fact a charitable trust.73 The Attorney General 
was apparently uncertain about what “course of action [to take] 
to prevent or to cure a breach of trust.”74 During a hearing in 
the litigation the Deputy Attorney General stated that the “At-
torney General was anticipating that St. Olaf would petition 
the court on ‘how it intends to use’ the sale proceeds . . . .”75 The 
judge replied: “What if they don’t? I can’t go out and force them 
 
12, at 262 (“Staffing problems and a relative lack of interest in monitoring 
nonprofits make attorney general oversight more theoretical than deterrent.”).  
 67. Helge, supra note 13, at 36.  
 68. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 324–25. 
 69. Id. at 325.  
 70. Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 
1400, 1431 (1998).  
 71. See Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 20, In re WCAL Charitable 
Trust, No. A09-703 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009) (“When the Attorney Gen-
eral fails to protect the public interest, the law allows a person with sufficient 
interest who understands the purpose and the operation of the trust to do 
so . . . .”); FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 328 (“The general rule is that a 
person must be able to show that he is entitled to a benefit from the trust be-
yond the benefit to which members of the public in general are entitled.” (cit-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. b (1959))). 
 72. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1. 
 73. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 71, at 18. 
 74. Id. at 19.  
 75. Id.  
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to.”76 This demonstrates that at times private parties are forced 
to act and that attorneys general are reluctant to act when they 
would be caught in the middle of a controversy. 
In contrast with the inaction of the Minnesota Attorney 
General, the Tennessee Attorney General swooped in when 
Fisk University intended to sell the Stieglitz Art Collection.77 
Unfortunately, the Attorney General could only develop half-
measures to forestall the art sale.78 Tennessee trial and appel-
late courts concluded that the Attorney General’s “temporary 
fix” was insufficient.79 Through further appeals processes, the 
Tennessee Attorney General is still attempting to prevent the 
sale.80 Although Tennessee’s Attorney General is actively at-
tempting to prevent the sale of the charitable trust, his at-
tempts have proven unsuccessful in protecting the intent of the 
donor to keep the art at Fisk University.81  
States have recognized the difficulties faced by attorneys 
general in monitoring charitable trusts. To assist attorneys 
general in overcoming difficulties in their supervisor role—
similar to those that the Minnesota and Tennessee Attorneys 
General experienced—a number of states have a charity bureau 
or separate division within the attorney general’s office.82 How-
ever these bureaus are not any more active or passionate about 
enforcing charitable trusts than attorneys general them-
selves.83  
Comparable to charity bureaus within the offices of the at-
torneys general, some scholars have proposed advisory commis-
sions that enforce charitable trusts and operate under the su-
 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Press Release, Office of the Tenn. Att’y Gen., Attorney General 
Files for Potential Temporary Stieglitz Collection Display Arrangement (Sept. 
10, 2010), available at http://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/press/2010/story/pr10 
-33.pdf. 
 78. See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, at 1–2 (Tenn. Ch. Ct. Sept. 14, 
2010), available at http://www.tennessean.com/assets/pdf/DN164021914.PDF. 
 79. Id. at 2.  
 80. See Marsteller, supra note 7. 
 81. See In re Fisk Univ., No. 05-2994-III, at 5 (allowing a sale that would 
keep the art at Fisk University only half the time); Marsteller, supra note 7 
(noting that this ruling was upheld on appeal); Jennifer Brooks, Fisk, AG Un-
happy With Art Ruling, TENNESSEAN, Nov. 5, 2010, at Main News (discussing 
the 2010 ruling). 
 82. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 183; see, e.g., CHARI-
TIES NYS.COM, http://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.jsp ( last visited June 
4, 2012).  
 83. Fishman, supra note 12, at 268. 
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pervision of the attorney general.84 Although advisory commis-
sions have qualities that would improve the current regulation 
of charitable trusts, the potential downfalls prove it unworka-
ble. First and foremost, the ultimate ability to determine chari-
table trust mismanagement and prosecution would be left to at-
torneys general, thus not avoiding the intrinsic problems 
associated with their offices.85 Furthermore, just as attorneys 
general are motivated by political goals,86 seemingly neutral 
actors may have other objectives in mind than serving the in-
tended public purpose of the charitable trust. Additionally, po-
litically influential individuals support commissions and thus 
those powerful parties could influence the neutrality of the ad-
visory commission.87  
These concerns can be analogized to apprehensions about 
presidential advisory commissions. Presidential advisory com-
missions have been described as unfavorable because they al-
low the President to avoid his responsibilities, are not more mo-
tivated or effective than the President, are in fact controlled by 
the White House, and the commission’s suggestions are ulti-
mately ignored when action actually is taken.88 Therefore, it is 
unlikely that advisory commissions under the control of attor-
neys general would solve the issues of uninterested and inac-
tive supervision.  
In sum, the time and focus that attorneys general typically 
devote to charitable trusts has contributed to their ineffective-
ness as charitable trust watchdogs. Even though courts have 
recognized the problems associated with an inactive regulator 
by increasingly granting standing to private parties to enforce 
charitable trusts, private suits have repercussions of their 
own.89 Additionally, separate divisions within the offices of the 
attorneys general, which were created to support the supervi-
 
 84. See, e.g., id. at 272. 
 85. See Helge, supra note 13, at 59–60 (“[R]elying on the attorney general 
to prosecute wrongdoings found by the commission invokes all of the previous-
ly discussed financial, institutional, political, and agency constraints.”). 
 86. For a discussion of how politics affects decisionmaking in the offices of 
attorneys general, see infra Part II.A.3.  
 87. THOMAS R. WOLANIN, PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSIONS 141 
(1975) (“[T]hose who advocate that commissions be created are generally polit-
ically sophisticated, influential people . . . .”). 
 88. Id. at 3.  
 89. See generally Brody, supra note 18, at 189 (explaining that courts 
have “not been consistent in the legal theory they apply, and they sometimes 
do not apply their chosen legal theory accurately” to questions of standing and 
the spillover effect of these judicial decisions).  
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sion by attorneys general, have not shown to cure the lack of 
attention given to charitable trusts. Although the multiple du-
ties vested to the offices of the attorneys general can explain 
part of this indifference for charitable trusts, the lack of re-
sources and political pressure also adds to the disappointment 
of attorneys general in curbing the abuse of charitable trusts.  
2. Lack of Resources in the Offices of Attorneys General 
Attorneys general also lack the resources needed to enforce 
charitable trusts. Because there is typically a large volume of 
charitable trusts in each state, attorneys general need to be 
equipped with adequate resources, including information, time, 
staff, and funding, to investigate and prosecute charitable 
wrongdoings.90 However, as discussed above, the charitable 
sector is usually only a subset of the consumer protections obli-
gations of the attorneys general.91 Additionally, because of the 
financial crisis state budgets likely will not allow extra funding 
to be allocated to monitoring charitable trusts.92 “As a practical 
matter, then, only abuses that (1) involve high dollar amounts, 
(2) receive media attention and notoriety, or (3) involve particu-
larly reprehensible behavior, are subject to the attorney gen-
eral’s scrutiny.”93 The thousands of other charitable trusts and 
organizations are left with no oversight.94  
Insufficient information regarding charitable trusts plays a 
role in attorneys general neglecting the exploitation of the 
trusts.95 Only a handful of states have enacted some sort of reg-
istration and reporting with the attorneys general for charita-
ble organizations, including charitable trusts.96 Since the ma-
jority of states do not require reporting that identifies fiduciary 
breaches (but instead focuses on charitable solicitation), abuses 
 
 90. Patton, supra note 26, at 166. 
 91. Helge, supra note 13, at 24. 
 92. See ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORI-
TIES, STATES CONTINUE TO FEEL RECESSION’S IMPACT 1 (Jan. 9, 2012), http:// 
www.cbpp.org/files/9-8-08sfp.pdf (explaining how budget shortfalls have 
prompted lawmakers to make deep cuts in critical public services).  
 93. Patton, supra note 26, at 166. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Helge, supra note 13, at 15 (“[T]he forty jurisdictions that do not 
require annual reporting from non-soliciting charities do not receive any in-
formation, and thus cannot discern breaches of fiduciary duties . . . .”).  
 96. See Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52 & n.53.  
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of charitable trusts,97 which do not always solicit funds from 
the public, will escape detection by the attorneys general.  
Moreover, organizations that constitute the majority of the 
revenue for the charitable sector are exempt from the register-
ing and reporting requirements.98 Exempt institutions include 
“churches and other religious organization[s], educational insti-
tutions, and hospitals and organizations that annually raise 
less than a particular amount.”99 Only eleven states require re-
porting for nonsoliciting charities and organizations, such as 
universities and hospitals that compose seventy percent of 
charitable resources.100 Attorneys general are unable to fulfill 
their duty to oversee charitable trusts that they may not even 
know exist. As a result a substantial number of fiduciary 
breaches will go unnoticed, not only because attorneys general 
are more focused on corrupt solicitation, but also because of the 
lack of information supplied to attorneys general regarding the 
management of the trusts.101 
This lack of information, coupled with the many other obli-
gations imposed on attorneys general, disincentivizes attorneys 
general to recognize and curb abuses of charitable trusts, and is 
only exacerbated by states’ lack of monetary resources.102 The 
United States is currently recovering from its largest recession 
since the 1930s.103 Because of this financial crisis the states are 
suffering huge budget deficits that compel substantial reduc-
tion in services.104 With no end in sight, significant public ser-
vices will likely continue to struggle with funding shortages for 
years.105 This lack of funding, for example, does not permit at-
torneys general to staff their offices adequately, leading to in-
 
 97. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443. 
 98. See id. at 315.  
 99. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 187. 
 100. See Helge, supra note 13, at 14–15, 15 n.77. 
 101. See id. at 15 (suggesting that a lack of reporting makes it difficult to 
“discern breaches of fiduciary duties from a substantial majority of charitable 
organizations”). 
 102. Id. at 14 n.74; Komoroski, supra note 27,. 
 103. See MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92 (noting the recession that began 
in 2007 has caused the largest collapse in state revenues on record); Samuel-
son, supra note 1. 
 104. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92; David Von Drehle, The Other Finan-
cial Crisis, TIME, June 28, 2010, at 22 (describing state budget deficits).  
 105. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92. 
 2012] SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS 1813 
 
adequate review of the reported information.106 This shortage 
of resources only adds to the lack of accountability in the chari-
table sector.107  
3. Attorneys General Need the Vote 
Although “attorneys general almost universally lack suffi-
cient resources to effectively oversee and enforce charitable 
gifts,”108 the laxity cannot be attributed solely to the lack of re-
sources.109 The fact that attorneys general are elected offi-
cials110 may also affect the motives of attorneys general to in-
tervene on abuses of charitable trusts.111 Attorneys general are 
the second most prevalent statewide-elected office, next to gov-
ernors.112 Since attorneys general are surrounded by the media 
and politics,113 it is not surprising that attorneys general will 
ignore the transactions that could hurt them politically, yet 
prosecute those that are politically favorable.114  
 
 106. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 445 (explaining that the “few 
active programs in existence operate with limited staff and inadequate finan-
cial resources”); Fishman, supra note 12, at 262–63.  
 107. See Blasko et al., supra note 57, at 38–39; Helge, supra note 13, at 20–
21; Komoroski, supra note 27.  
 108. Loving, supra note 2, at 460.  
 109. Brody, supra note 8, at 952–53. 
 110. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 15; NAT’L ASSOC. OF 
ATTORNEYS GEN., http://www.naag.org/about_naag.php ( last visited June 4, 
2012) (“The Attorney General is popularly elected in 43 states . . . and is ap-
pointed by the governor in five states.”). 
 111. Brody, supra note 8, at 975 (“The typical state legal regime and politi-
cal pressures produce the twin weaknesses of the charitable sector: the lack of 
energy and initiative on the part of many nonprofit managers, and the lack of 
resources and zeal in enforcing the public’s interest on the part of many chari-
ty regulators.”).  
 112. STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42, at 15.  
 113. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, the Supreme Law of the Land, 
and Attorney General Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1987) 
(detailing how the attorney general operates in the world of politics and media).  
 114. Brody, supra note 8, at 947–48 (“The incentives of this nearly univer-
sally elective office impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically 
dangerous and to jump into matters that are politically irresistible but impli-
cate only ‘business’ decisions of charity managers.”). Additionally, outside ac-
tors can influence the political campaigns of attorneys general. EMILY 
GOTTLIEB & AMY WIDMAN, CTR. FOR JUSTICE & DEMOCRACY, STATE ATTOR-
NEYS GENERAL: THE PEOPLE’S CHAMPION 1 (2008), available at http://www 
.cttriallawyers.org/_docs/public/CJD_State_Attorneys_General.pdf (demon-
strating influence on attorneys general by arguing “insurance, tobacco, phar-
maceutical and other industries . . . have launched unfair, misleading assaults 
against state Attorneys General, even to the point of manipulating state elec-
tions to defeat popular pro-consumer candidates for state Attorneys General”).  
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As recognized by scholars, the controversial case In re Mil-
ton Hershey School Trust115 demonstrates how political pres-
sures on attorneys general can dictate the officials’ actions.116 
In 2001, the Milton Hershey School, which was founded in 1909 
by Milton Hershey and his wife for the benefit of orphan chil-
dren,117 became financially challenged.118 The trustees became 
concerned about the stability of the School Trust and, after 
meeting with the Pennsylvania Attorney General, who had ex-
pressed similar concerns, understood that they could sell their 
interest in the trust.119 After public disagreement over the sale, 
the Attorney General, who apparently had a change of heart (or 
more likely, because he was running for governor)120 brought 
suit to stop the sale.121 Some have alleged that this course of 
action was designed to protect the Attorney General’s political 
goals.122 Similarly, if the Attorney General had been running 
for reelection, instead of running for governor as in this case, 
he would have had the same political pressures to please the 
public because he needs the vote. 
Similarly, political considerations—although not the only 
factor—led Walter F. Mondale, then Minnesota Attorney Gen-
eral, to continue the investigation his predecessor, Miles Lord, 
began of the Sister Kenny Institute, a Minneapolis-based chari-
table foundation developed to benefit polio research.123 Mondale 
uncovered a “cesspool” in which “millions of dollars were being 
siphoned off for the benefit of one or two officers” of the organi-
zation.124 In his autobiography, Mondale explains that since he 
was going to be up for election he thought the Sister Kenny In-
stitute investigation would establish him with Minnesotan vot-
 
 115. 807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).  
 116. Brody, supra note 8, at 984–99. However, these circumstances are 
unusual in that here political influences actually acted to protect the trust, 
versus the more common result of destruction of the trust.  
 117. In re Milton Hershey Sch. Trust, 807 A.2d at 328.  
 118. See id. at 329; Brody, supra note 8, at 989–90. 
 119. Brody, supra note 8, at 990–91. 
 120. See id. at 946 (“Political cynics believe that ‘A.G.’ stands not for ‘attor-
ney general’ but for ‘aspiring governor.’”). 
 121. Id. at 989–91.  
 122. The attorney general’s opponent in the governor’s race was not shy in 
pointing out that “[i]t was Fisher’s office who told the Hershey board they 
should sell in the first place.” Id. at 998 n.302. 
 123. WALTER F. MONDALE WITH DAVID HAGE, THE GOOD FIGHT: A LIFE IN 
LIBERAL POLITICS 15 (2010).  
 124. Id. 
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ers.125 Mondale was influenced by political considerations to get 
his foot in the door in order to carry out his programs and poli-
cies.126 This will always be a practical concern for elected offi-
cials, because unless they are elected they will not have the op-
portunity to carry out their policies.  
Thus, although these cases demonstrate the unusual cir-
cumstance—where political influences actually acted to protect 
the trust, compared to the more common result of destruction of 
the trust—they further demonstrate political incentives acting 
on attorneys general decisions to invoke their enforcement 
power or remain “passive law office[s].”127 
Political influences on an attorney general’s motive either 
to step in and enforce the trust or turn a blind eye are further 
heightened by the fact that in some of these complex dealings 
there are powerful actors within the state seeking the unau-
thorized deviations from the charitable trust’s purpose.128 The 
WCAL and the Barnes Foundation cases illustrate these power-
ful influences. 
WCAL was a radio station created from charitable dona-
tions, and St. Olaf College was the trustee of this charitable 
trust. By 2004 WCAL was broadcasting to more than 80,000 
listeners “classical music, public-affairs programs, and religious 
services” that echoed “the intellectual, spiritual, and cultural 
traditions of St. Olaf.”129 Even though WCAL was serving its 
intended mission,130 St. Olaf was questioning the value the ra-
dio station contributed to the educational institution.131 When 
Minnesota Public Radio (MPR) made a multi-million dollar of-
 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id. Mondale’s investigation of the Sister Kennedy Institute was “cor-
rect and legal, not just the efforts of a young political hotshot.” Id. at 18. In 
fact, Mondale realized that as attorney general, he was the “trustee of charita-
ble trusts” and was the “master of these disputes.” Id.  
 127. See id. at 20 (describing how Mondale changed the role of Attorney 
General in Minnesota).  
 128. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. KING & RANDALL W. ROTH, BROKEN TRUST: 
GREED, MISMANAGEMENT, & POLITICAL MANIPULATION AT AMERICA’S LARG-
EST CHARITABLE TRUST 279–81 (2006) (detailing the Attorney General’s refusal 
to continue investigation); MONDALE WITH HAGE, supra note 123, at 16 (noting 
the Sister Kenny “board included distinguished people from the Twin Cities 
business and civic community . . . [s]o it was a terrible shock when the public 
and the foundation’s board learned that some of its leaders were corrupt”).  
 129. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. A09-703, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1–
2 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009). 
 130. See id. at *1. St. Olaf was also required to show that the radio station 
benefited the public interest in order to be licensed by the FCC. Id.  
 131. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, supra note 71, at 11.  
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fer to St. Olaf to buy the broadcasting license and all the asso-
ciated assets, St. Olaf willingly accepted.132 Neither St. Olaf nor 
MPR notified the Minnesota Attorney General of the sale nor 
sought judicial approval.133 Furthermore, the directors of 
WCAL, which the Federal Communications Commission re-
quired to ensure that the public was permitted to “participate 
in significant policy decisions,” were not included in this deci-
sion and learned of the offer four days after St. Olaf ’s ac-
ceptance.134 It was SaveWCAL, a corporation created to pre-
serve WCAL, which disclosed the sale to the Attorney General, 
who then failed to take any action to prevent the transaction.135  
The potential peril for an attorney general or other elected 
official who opposes a major media company was demonstrat-
ed during the MPR campaign for financing for the transaction. 
MPR first turned to the Housing & Redevelopment Authority 
(HRA) to issue tax-exempt bonds for the acquisition.136 When 
the HRA denied the application, MPR publicly criticized the in-
dividual HRA commissioners who voted against its applica-
tion.137 Although MPR then successfully applied to another 
public authority to obtain the bonds,138 only SaveWCAL chal-
lenged this final sale.139 It is reasonable to assume that an 
elected politician would avoid taking action in controversial 
transactions, such as the sale of WCAL, in order to evade polit-
ically endangering his or her reputation. 
 
 132. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *2; Appellant’s 
Brief & Appendix, supra note 71, at 11–12. 
 133. In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *2. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at *3.  
 136. See Petition to Redress Breach of Trust at 11–12, In re WCAL Chari-
table Trust, No. 66-CV-083602, 2009 WL 6767286 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Feb. 25, 
2009) (discussing MPR ’s attempt to secure bond financing from HRA). 
137. See Exhibit DDD at 2, In re WCAL Charitable Trust, No. 66-CV-
083602, 2009 WL 6767286 (demonstrating MPR ’s use of its website to target 
commissioners who voted against the resolution). Mondale explains a similar 
experience, stating: “[a]fter all the publicity on the Sister Kenny Case, I was 
starting to take some hits in the political arena from people who accused me of 
becoming a tyrant operating out of the attorney general’s office.” MONDALE 
WITH HAGE, supra note 123, at 18. 
 138. Petition to Redress Breach of Trust, supra note 136, at 12 (noting that 
the St. Paul Port Authority voted to issue tax-exempt bonds to finance the 
transaction); Nicole Garrison-Sprenger, MPR Gets $11.5M in Financing from 
St. Paul Port Authority, MINNEAPOLIS ST. PAUL BUSS. J. (Sept. 28, 2005, 9:31 
AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2005/09/26/daily25.html.  
 139. See In re WCAL Charitable Trust, 2009 WL 5092650, at *1–4. 
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As with the WCAL radio station, influential actors were in-
terested in the Barnes Foundation.140 The Barnes Foundation 
was a charitable trust developed by Dr. Albert Barnes com-
posed of “some of the world’s finest examples of post-
impressionist and early modern works . . . .”141 Because Barnes 
intended to use the Foundation for educational purposes, not as 
an art museum, he placed strict restrictions on the Foundation, 
including a provision that the collection should never be moved 
from its original location in Merion, Pennsylvania.142 However, 
after the death of Barnes, the Foundation struggled to prevent 
bankruptcy.143 To save the Foundation, the board of directors, 
after pressure from the Pennsylvania Governor and Attorney 
General,144 agreed to expand its board in consideration for fi-
nancial assistance from other nonprofit organizations.145  
Shortly thereafter, the expanded board successfully 
brought a petition to the court in a cy près hearing asking per-
mission to move the Barnes to Philadelphia because it was fi-
nancially impossible to keep the Barnes collection in the cur-
rent location.146 When the “Friends of the Barnes,” composed 
partly of former students, petitioned the court to reopen the 
proceedings regarding the move, the petition was dismissed 
holding the petitioners did not have standing.147 Opponents of 
the move argue that the expanded Board never wanted to pre-
serve the Barnes Foundation in Merion and that there was no 
one to stand up against these powerful political forces, such as 
 
 140. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46 (“The name of the game is, if 
you’re gonna leave your paintings somewhere, don’t let there be a politician 
within 500 yards.”).  
 141. FAQS, BARNES FOUND., http://www.barnesfoundation.org/about/faq 
( last visited June 4, 2012). 
 142. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1747, 1749–51; THE ART OF THE STEAL, 
supra note 46. Another motivating factor for Dr. Barnes’s desired location for 
the Foundation was his animosity toward the Philadelphia elite. Id.  
 143. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1752.  
 144. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46 (presenting Pennsylvania At-
torney General Mike Fisher, stating that “I had to explain to them that . . . the 
attorney general’s office would have to take some action involving them that 
might have to change the complexion of the board”).  
 145. Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 1752–53; THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra 
note 46. 
 146. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46. 
 147. In re Barnes Found., 871 A.2d 792, 793–94 (Pa. 2005); Jason Edward 
Kaufman, Barnes Foundation Wins Ruling to Move to City Centre: Court Dis-
misses Petitions From Two Organisations Hoping to Keep the Collection in 
Merion County, ART NEWSPAPER, June 1, 2008, http://www.theartnewspaper 
.com/article.asp?id=8571. 
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the Pennsylvania Governor, Attorney General, and the heads of 
the influential nonprofit organizations involved in the  
transaction.148  
Therefore, to avoid controversial and daunting litigation—
similar to the legal battles that took place in the WCAL and 
Barnes Foundation cases—and the overwhelming issues that 
plague the offices of the attorneys general, such as the lack of 
motivation by attorneys general diligently to monitor charitable 
trusts and the insufficient resources allocated to most of the of-
fices of attorneys general, some have suggested supervision of 
charitable trusts should be independent from the attorneys 
general.149 An organization with the exclusive power to monitor 
and enforce charitable trusts would allow potential fiduciary 
breaches to be detected and avoided. Although political influ-
ences and ulterior motives cannot be completely removed in 
matters regarding public interest, such motives would be less 
persuasive to an independent party not seeking election. 
B. A STATE AGENCY IS BETTER SUITED TO CURB CHARITABLE 
TRUST ABUSES VERSUS AN AGENCY AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL 
Although independence from attorneys general seems to be 
ideal, scholars have questioned if supervision of charitable 
trusts should remain at the state level or move to the federal 
level.150 Because only twelve states subject nonsolicitation char-
itable trusts to registration and reporting requirements, and 
there are regulatory variations among those states, scholars 
have expressed concerns about forum-shopping in an effort to 
avoid strict regulations.151 Recognizing forum-shopping prob-
lems, in the 1980s the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral and the National Association of State Charity Officials be-
gan working with the IRS to improve information gathering,152 
and thus avoid forum-shopping incentives.  
Although federal regulation may diminish forum-shopping 
concerns, federal regulation of charitable trusts would not ade-
quately detect and defer fiduciary breaches of charitable trusts. 
Recently, one commentator proposed creating a new self-funded 
 
 148. THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46. 
 149. See e.g., Karst, supra note 31, at 476–77.  
 150. Fishman, supra note 12, at 268; Helge, supra note 13, at 54.  
 151. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 55 (“[W]ide discrepancies in the 
regulatory climate encouraged forum-shopping and facilitated evasion of regu-
lation, limiting the ability of these states to correct many abuses.”).  
 152. Id.  
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federal agency.153 In effect, the proposed agency would replace 
the IRS’s obligations of regulating federal tax laws for charita-
ble organizations, including those that are exempt.154 In es-
sence, this proposed solution would be focused on the charitable 
status of organizations for tax purposes.155 Although this pro-
posal seems to solve charities’ wrongful manipulation of poten-
tial tax-exempt status156—crucially without the assistance of 
government funding—it does not seem to adequately solve de-
viations of donors’ intent in charitable trusts. For example, as 
described above with the Barnes Foundation, the Foundation 
still serves the public interest by moving to Philadelphia and 
therefore still maintains its charitable tax status; however, 
housing the collection in Philadelphia was explicitly against 
Barnes’ intent for his art.157 Thus, it is unlikely that a federal 
agency focused on the tax status of charitable trusts would pre-
vent fiduciary breaches or mismanagement of the trusts.  
Additionally, concerns about inconsistencies between the 
states regulation schemas fostering forum-shopping158 may not 
be such a large fear for charitable trusts. Many charitable 
trusts are created in local areas to serve interests that are near 
and dear to the donors’ hearts.159 A state regulatory agency 
would be better equipped to understand, evaluate, and address 
the public interest being served in that particular area.160 Fed-
eral supervisors are too far removed from the localized concerns 
of the charitable trusts.161 Furthermore, the IRS tax regula-
tions that have improved reporting would not be altered if a 
regulator agency was at the state level versus the federal level. 
A state agency and the IRS could form a relationship to share 
information and monitoring, as the National Association of At-
torneys General and the National Association of State Charity 
 
 153. Helge, supra note 13, at 70.  
 154. Id. at 68–81. 
 155. Id. at 76–79. 
 156. Id. at 79–81. 
 157. See THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46. 
 158. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 444.  
 159. See Karst, supra note 31, at 482 (“[I]t should be noted that there are 
some real values to be maintained in keeping charities and their control close 
to the communities from which they spring, and which they seek to serve.”).  
 160. See id. (identifying states as regulatory laboratories best able to serve 
local interests). 
 161. Cf. id. (arguing that federal intervention is justified only after state 
experimentation has demonstrated the ideal model). 
 1820 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1795 
 
Officials did in the 1980s,162 to prevent any possible forum-
shopping incentives. Thus, an independent, self-sustaining, 
state agency with the power to enforce charitable trusts would 
be ideal. 
III.  CREATING AN EFFECTIVE WATCHDOG OF 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS   
In order to effectively supervise charitable trusts, self-
funded, independent, quasi-state agencies need to be developed. 
These non-governmental agencies would be independent from, 
and replace, state attorneys general as the watchdogs of chari-
table trusts. These agencies would be responsible for the infor-
mation collecting, evaluating, and prosecution of charitable 
trust abuses.163 Each agency would be composed of a board of 
directors with members that would be invested in the public in-
terest, but would not have any direct attachments to the par-
ticular trusts.164 This Part explains the responsibilities and 
formation of these agencies. 
A. RESPONSIBILITIES TO MONITOR REGISTRATION AND 
REPORTING  
These quasi-state agencies would assume the obligations of 
the state attorneys general to regulate charitable trusts and to 
serve the public interest. As a result, the agencies would be re-
sponsible for all the duties associated with the role of attorneys 
general as charitable trust watchdogs.165 Additionally, the 
agencies would be responsible for maintaining detailed records 
of all charitable trusts in the state. Following the lead of the 
New York Charities Bureau’s registration and reporting 
scheme, charitable trusts would be required to register the 
 
 162. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 55. 
 163. Helge, supra note 13, at 64 (explaining the enforcement model as 
granting “the regulatory body . . . authority to promulgate rules, investigate 
breaches of these rules, and bring enforcement actions for wrongdoings”). 
 164. But see id. at 71 (arguing that “inclusion of the charitable sector’s 
voice in its oversight is vital to the effectiveness of the sector’s regulation”). 
 165. The legislature has the power to take duties away from the attorney 
general, thus the legislature would vest the quasi-state agency with the attor-
ney general’s regulatory obligations regarding charitable trusts. See Clayton, 
supra note 9, at 528 (“‘There is and has been no doubt that the legislature may 
deprive the attorney general of specific powers; but in the absence of such au-
thority he typically may exercise all such authority as the public interest re-
quires.’” (quoting Florida ex rel Shevin v. Exxon Corp., 526 F.2d 266, 268–69 
(5th Cir. 1976))). 
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trust with the state agency and supply annual reporting.166 
Registration would include not only the trust’s financial infor-
mation, but also the trust instrument explaining the purpose 
and restrictions imposed on the trust.167 In order to account for 
all charitable trusts, organizations like universities and hospi-
tals would not be exempt from the registration and reporting 
requirements.168 Non-solicitation charities would also be re-
quired to comply with the registration and reporting. Moreover, 
contrary to most of the current practices of attorneys gen-
eral,169 the solicitation of charitable funds would not be the 
agency’s primary concern because the majority of charitable 
trusts do not solicit public funding.170 Although this may cause 
consternation for potential mistreatment of funds that are so-
licited for charitable purposes, that fear can be displaced by 
maintaining the attorney general as the regulator for solicita-
tion of charitable funds.171 In the unusual event that a charita-
ble trust solicits funds, the quasi-state agency would collabo-
rate with the attorney general to effectively monitor potential 
abuses of both fiduciary obligations and solicitation.172  
 
 166. See Brody, supra note 8, at 951–52, 952 n.54. However, unlike the 
New York Charities Bureau, the proposed agencies would not operate under 
the state attorney general.  
 167. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.111 (West 2011) (establishing cor-
porate registration requirements under Minnesota law); PROTECTION OF 
CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5 (Tentative Draft 2011), available at http://www 
.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/2011feb_draft.pdf (identifying infor-
mation to be held in an attorney general’s registry under model code); N.Y. 
State Office of the Att’y Gen., FAQs—Registration, CHARITIES NYS.COM, 
http://www.charitiesnys.com/faqs_reg_new.jsp ( last visited June 4, 2012) ( list-
ing registration requirements for New York charities).  
 168. But see PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5 (Tentative Draft 
2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/2011feb_ 
draft.pdf (creating a category of exemptions from registration requirements). 
 169. FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 443 (explaining that attorneys 
general focus most of their attention and resources on the solicitation of chari-
table funds).  
 170. See id. at 375 (explaining that the 1960 Karst proposal has not been 
adopted by states because the focus has shifted to federal government and IRS 
enforcement solutions and because of problems with state regulation of Inter-
net solicitation).  
 171. See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, supra note 42 (suggesting that in 
practice the regulation of charitable trusts and the regulation of charitable so-
licitation are often mutually exclusive). 
 172. Thus the attorney general, partnered with the IRS, would still be re-
sponsible for enforcing proper charitable solicitation and the agency would be 
responsible for enforcing the restrictions set forth in the charitable trust doc-
ument and ensuring that the trust served the purpose it was intended to 
serve.  
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The agencies would have the responsibility to methodically 
review the registration and reports and evaluate if any further 
investigation is needed to prevent abuse or mismanagement.173 
Since this would be the agency’s sole duty, the issue of this ob-
ligation becoming a secondary concern would be obsolete.174 
Following an enforcement model of regulation, the agency 
would be authorized by the state legislature to enforce a chari-
table trust if the trustee breached a fiduciary duty.175 An en-
forcement model of regulation would cure the problems that 
underlay commissions or bureaus that operate under an advi-
sory model of regulation.176 In addition, because of the quality 
of information provided to the agency and the effective review 
of that information, the agency would be better equipped to 
propose successful solutions if a charitable trust became impos-
sible or impractical. Thus, if absolutely necessary, in a cy près 
hearing the agency could recommend plausible modifications to 
the restrictions of the charitable trust without completely over-
running the intent of donors.  
B. DEVELOPING THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The success of the agency would stem from the construc-
tion of the board of directors. The volunteer board would be 
composed of individuals who have a strong interest and experi-
ence in the charitable sector.177 The set number of board mem-
bers would vary from state to state depending on the demand 
for charitable trust regulation. States with more charitable 
trusts would require an agency with more personnel to support 
 
 173. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273. Similar to elements of the Uni-
form Law Commission’s ongoing project to draft a model act on attorney gen-
eral protection of charitable assets, the agency could conduct an investigation 
if “a law or legal duty concerning the use or management of charitable assets 
has been violated.” PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 4 (Tentative 
Draft 2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ocaa/ 
2011feb_draft.pdf.  
 174. Furthermore, nonprofit organizations and charities have become in-
creasingly large, complex, and pervasive, and having a separate state agency 
to monitor the sector is reasonable. See THE ART OF THE STEAL, supra note 46. 
 175. See Clayton, supra note 9, at 528 (illustrating how state legislatures 
can empower agencies to act in lieu of the attorney general). But see Fishman, 
supra note 12, at 273–74 (advocating for the assistant attorney general to ini-
tiate actions against breaches of duty).  
 176. See Helge, supra note 13, at 60 (identifying lack of uniformity, cost, 
politicization, and agency restraints as reasons the advisory model fails). 
 177. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273 (illustrating an ideal mixture of 
individuals to constitute charitable commissioners).  
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the demand.178 The members of the charitable trust agency’s 
board would be appointed by the governor and the state su-
preme court—similar to the boards created by the Minnesota 
legislature, such as the Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage Coun-
cil and the Minnesota State Art Board.179  
Nomination by seemingly neutral actors, such as justices of 
the state supreme court, would not ensure noncorrupt behavior. 
For example, the Bishop Estate trust—a charitable trust creat-
ed by Princess Bernice Pauahi Bishop, one of the largest land-
owners and the richest woman in the Hawaiian kingdom, to 
erect and maintain the Kamehameha Schools to benefit the 
children of the Hawaiian Islands—involved corrupt Hawaii Su-
preme Court justices taking millions of dollars from the trust 
for personal gain.180 Additionally, appointment by an elected 
official is similar to advisory commissions,181 which are super-
vised by that official and therefore still subject to political in-
fluences. Although not all politics would be removed, to curb 
these potential conflicts the attorney general would not super-
vise the enforcement agency. Furthermore, appointment would 
at least remove the direct political influences that are inherent 
with elected officials.182 In a further effort to prevent outside 
influences affecting the board members’ neutrality, if a conflict 
of interest arose the affected board member would be required 
to remove him or herself from the monitoring of that particular 
charitable trust.183 
C. FULLY SELF-FUNDED 
The charitable trust agencies would be completely self-
funded, unlike the Minnesota boards mentioned above, which 
 
 178. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 444–45 (noting that certain 
states have thousands of charities supervised by attorneys general with “lim-
ited staff and inadequate financial resources”).  
 179. See Fishman, supra note 12, at 273; Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage 
Council Members, LESSARD-SAMS OUTDOOR HERITAGE COUNCIL, http://www 
.lsohc.leg.mn/Member/index.html ( last visited June 4, 2012) (identifying the 
twelve members of the Lessard-Sams Outdoor Heritage Council); Board Mem-
bers, MINN. ST. ARTS BOARD, http://www.arts.state.mn.us/contact/board.htm 
( last visited June 4, 2012) (identifying the members and officers of the Minne-
sota State Arts Board).  
 180. KING & ROTH, supra note 128, at 211–14.  
 181. See WOLANIN, supra note 87. 
 182. Brody, supra note 8, at 984. 
 183. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 317A.255 (West 2011) (establishing 
standards for legitimate and illegitimate conflicts of interest for the director of 
a trust).  
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are funded by a portion of the state’s sale tax.184 In order to ful-
ly fund the agencies, a fee would be assessed at the time of ini-
tial registration and annually thereafter.185 Because the organ-
izations that traditionally have been exempt from registration 
and reporting would also be required to comply with the re-
quirements, the organization’s income and assets would be con-
sidered when determining the registration and annual report-
ing fees, so not to make it financially unattainable for a 
charitable trust to be formed.186 However, the registration and 
reporting fees would have to be assessed to cover all investiga-
tive and enforcement procedures, which could potentially cause 
high annual fees leading to a disincentive to form a charitable 
trust. Additionally, although the board of directors would be 
filled on a volunteer basis, the fees would encompass the agen-
cy’s staff compensation. If the annual fees are not able to raise 
the necessary funds, the agencies would become underfunded 
like many of the offices of attorneys general,187 resulting in con-
tinuing ineffectiveness in monitoring charitable trusts. Howev-
er, charitable trusts play an important role in local and nation-
al communities to relieve poverty, advance education, and 
religion.188 The inclination of individuals to donate to others in 
need or for public benefit is inherent in our society,189 and the 
 
 184. LESSARD-SAMS OUTDOOR HERITAGE COUNCIL, http://www.lsohc.leg 
.mn/index.html ( last visited June 4, 2012). 
 185. Helge, supra note 13, at 66–67 (analogizing to federal agencies that 
are self-funded). The Uniform Law Committee proposed a $15 registration fee 
with a $25 monthly late fee. PROTECTION OF CHARITABLE ASSETS ACT § 5 
(Tentative Draft 2011), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ 
ulc/ocaa/2011feb_draft.pdf. More likely than not, to fully support the agency’s 
regulatory power a slightly larger fee would be assessed.  
 186. See Helge, supra note 13, at 73 (arguing that self-funding fees can be 
placed on a sliding scale examining a trust’s asset size, gross revenues, or 
both). 
 187. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 14, at 445 (identifying underfunding 
as the principal reason for the disinterest of attorneys general in supervision 
of charitable trusts).  
 188. ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY & TRUSTS 995–96 (Routledge-Cavendish 
6th ed. 2010); see also Evelyn Brody & John Tyler, Respecting Foundation and 
Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private Philanthropy, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
571, 613–14 (2010) (arguing that charities provide a “powerful third force” 
that is an independent civic good). 
 189. See, e.g., Alison Dunn, As ‘Cold as Charity’?: Poverty, Equity, and the 
Charity Trust, 20 LEGAL STUD. 222, 223–25 (2000) (“Whether on religious or 
moral grounds, both Victorian and contemporary society have inclined toward 
the former, and by the nineteenth century there was a firm entrenchment of 
philanthropy in society.”). 
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law has long supported the continuation of this practice.190 
Thus, it is unlikely that this mandatory registration and re-
porting fee would be such a deterrent as to extinguish the crea-
tion of charitable trusts. 
A wholly self-funded agency is the main distinction from 
earlier proposed state agencies to supervise charitable trusts. 
Noticing the local importance of charitable trusts and the 
shortfalls of supervision,191 earlier proposals have suggested 
state agencies.192 One of the earliest proposals, suggested in 
1960, did not include a self-funded agency, but instead recom-
mended heavier taxation to support the agency.193 As men-
tioned above, states are already suffering from decreased tax 
revenue.194 Although this Note agrees that scholars were cor-
rect in recognizing that a separate state agency would cure 
many of the outstanding issues in charitable trust law, during 
the current financial crisis it is unrealistic to suggest that the 
state could spread its budget even more thinly to include a new 
agency to watch over charitable trusts.195 For that reason, state 
budgets would not have to incorporate this Note’s proposed in-
dependent agency into its budget. Furthermore, if the funding 
would come from the state taxes, there could be potential for 
variations in the effectiveness of agencies from state to state 
due to variations in funding leading to variations in resources. 
But with fees assessed to each charitable trust, the funding for 
the agency would correlate with the number of charities in that 
 
 190. See Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539, 591 (1867) (“Our an-
cestors brought with them from England the elements of the law of charitable 
uses, and . . . in substance and principle, [it] has always been considered as 
part of our common law.”). 
 191. Although it is unlikely that registration and reporting fees will deter 
charitable giving, “there is a compelling argument that potential donors will 
keep wealth in private hands rather than create charitable trusts if they be-
lieve their wishes will not be followed strictly.” Eisenstein, supra note 16, at 
1758. 
 192. Karst, supra note 31, at 483. 
 193. Id.; see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, FOUNDATIONS AND GOV-
ERNMENT 452–54 (1965). Fremont-Smith analyzes Karst’s 1960 proposal and 
argues that “[i]f the field of charity continues to grow,” Karst’s proposal of 
“separate Boards of Charity . . . will become, not only advisable, but highly de-
sirable.” Id. at 453.  
 194. MCNICHOL ET AL., supra note 92. 
 195. See Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Interest Adds Up to a 
$1.3 Billion Bill for States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/15/us/politics/15stimulus.html (reporting 
congressional refusal to assist state budgets during the recession). 
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particular state.196 Therefore, the agency would be adequately 
self-funded to support the effective supervision of all the states’ 
charitable trusts.  
In sum, a self-funded, independent, quasi-state agency 
would cure many of the outstanding enforcement issues in 
charitable trust law. A mandatory registration and reporting, 
like that suggested by the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws in 1954 and currently proposed, 
would provide the agency with the necessary information to de-
tect and prosecute fiduciary breaches of charitable trusts. Addi-
tionally, a mandatory registration and annual fee would allow 
the agency to be self-sufficient and completely independent 
from the state budget. Although this fee could cause hardships 
and deterrence impacts on a minority of charitable trusts, this 
impact would not be as significant as disincentives caused by 
donors’ wishes not being followed. Furthermore, there may still 
be a slight concern for political influences on the agency’s board 
of directors, but the board of directors would not be elected offi-
cials, thus avoiding the inherent political nature imbedded in 
attorneys general. When the public benefit at large is at issue it 
is highly unlikely that political influences will ever be com-
pletely removed. However, by creating an agency that is com-
posed of nominated directors, which is completely self-funded 
and independent, various political incentives can be subsided.  
  CONCLUSION   
Donors create charitable trusts to serve the public interest 
and set strict restrictions on the trust to ensure that those 
wishes are followed long after their death. As demonstrated by 
the current economic turmoil, the restrictions imposed on the 
charitable trusts can become impractical or impossible to obey. 
The recent financial crisis produces incentives for the trustees 
to diverge from the restrictions emphasizing the ineffective su-
pervision of the trusts by attorneys general. While taking into 
account the strained economies of the states, this Note’s pro-
posal to create self-funded, independent, quasi-state agencies, 
would resolve many of the issues outstanding in the manage-
ment of charitable trusts. Although political influences cannot 
be completely removed from supervision of charitable trusts, 
 
 196. Not every state has the same number of charities or charitable trusts; 
the majority of charities are in fact organized in one of the twelve states that 
have required registration of reporting for nonsolicitation purposes. FREMONT-
SMITH, supra note 14, at 444.  
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these agencies would certainly be less likely to be persuaded by 
political influences than state attorneys general, who are elect-
ed officials in the majority of the states. New agencies would 
help curb the abuses of charitable trusts and be better 
equipped to propose acceptable modifications if the restrictions 
imposed by the donor(s) become truly problematic. The recently 
experienced deviations from donors’ wishes will continue to be 
a problem if there is not an effective watchdog in place. This 
debate has been going on for far too long in the scholarly world, 
and it is time that the states take action. 
 
